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                                            Abstract 
 
This paper deals with cognitive theories behind agent-based modeling of 
learning and information processing methodologies. Herein, I undertake a 
descriptive analysis of how human agents learn to select action and maximize 
their value function under reinforcement learning model. In doing so, I have 
considered the spatio-temporal environment under bounded rationality using 
Markov Decision process modeling to generalize patterns of agent behavior by 
analyzing the determinants of value functions, and of factors that modify policy- 
action-induced cognitive abilities. Since detecting patterns are central to the 
human cognitive skills, this paper aspires at uncovering the entanglements of 
complex contextual pattern identification by linking contexts with optimal 
decisions that agents undertake under hypercompetitive market pressure through 
learning which have however, implicative applications in a wide array of social 
and macroeconomic domains. 
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1. Introduction 
 
‘The brain is the material instrument by which we retrace and combine ideas, 
and by which we remember, we reason, we invent’- 
                                                                                   ---- P.M. Roget (1834) 
IN THIS PAPER, I attempt to undertake an interdisciplinary approach to the 
study of problem solving and decision making as a path dependency process 
which leads to realization of certain reward related value functions in a given 
system with predefined values. I examine at the cellular level how agents learn to 
process and manage new information as well, take policy actions that maximize 
their value functions under spatial dimensions which determines the 
computational and cognitive limits of agents in a complex process of decision 
making. Applying a simple Markovian Decision Process (MDP) based-model 
that generalizes the evolution of agent behavior over time, this study 
demonstrates the efficiency of the evolutionary process of knowledge generation 
based on neuroscientific theories using new information and Reinforcement 
learning technology as of; how agents are able to pertain these under best 
possible procedures, and under rational environment available to these real 
economic agents. This work thus, draws upon other works of the authors, in 
particular, Rizzello (2003), Dosi et.al. (2011), Novarese and Rizzello (2001), 
Bayer and Reynou (2011)  and David (1997). The model that I propose in the 
present context helps to highlight the problem of choice in decision making 
when a system is given as it is; with all its initial values and several possible 
policy actions which when followed by these rational agents, would help to 
maximize their reward values. As such, it may be defined as a path dependence 
process, a property of complex dynamic systems where in a specified space of 
searching and exploration, it is impossible to know all the probable paths, and 
hence, to foresee all the possible outcomes. In a sense, this may lead to sub-
optimal equilibriums. In strategic models of choice under risk where factors that 
realize the discordances of individual preferences, i.e., incomplete knowledge, 
[3] 
 
uncertainty and information asymmetry, agents are required to undertake 
polyhedral thinking in order to maximize choice’s outcomes in terms of the 
functions of probability. It is through incremental innovation in perceptual 
learning mechanisms that agents develop certain ability as skill-sets, and discover 
value from certain policy actions while taking cues from past experiences from 
decisions that have been preceded by certain policy patterns. What I attempt in 
this regard, is not to develop a new model of decision making process, but apply 
Markov Decision Process to explain agent-based cognitive peculiarities in 
decision making process as well, to highlight cross-sectional consistencies in 
agent behavior (Bem and Allen, 1974) when they follow certain policy actions.  
That would, I presuppose, help generalize the complex parametrizations by 
integrating features of both agent-based learning methodology and 
reinforcement learning under MDP model framework, closely following 
(Oeffner, 2008) on computational agent-based dynamic equilibrium modeling. 
This would in such attempt, incorporate the parameters of both the models. 
The model simplification may be stated as; 
 
                                  Δ  ∑ 	  +   
 
Where, Δ is defined as the Cognitive capacity of agents under equilibrium, 
A and P as associative and reinforcement learning model, whereas, ‘i’ as 
attributes of mental states t as period for session‘s’.  and  as value taken 
by a dependent variable while  is the constant of the dummy variable . This 
model specification is conceived to represent the cognitive equilibrium state of 
agent behavior under uncertainty since the finalities of the process remains 
unknown and where, the model includes all the variables as independent 
attributes required to model such an equilibrium state. Since there are 
multitudes of factors that determine decision-making process within economic 
organizations, this complex form of interdependency and interactions between 
the agents and their environment involving unbounded number of variables to 
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represent the scientific concept of abstraction cannot be fully justified. 
Considering the fact that human beings have the limited capacity to deal with 
new information where agents have cognitive limitations and where information 
about future events are not available or foreseeable, this needs to be modeled by 
means of rational approach and, by using bounded variables. Here, the choice of 
decision is important to these agents since; they try to maximize the value 
derived from their actions based on certain policies. As such, generalized 
abstraction, although appear to play some role while taking policy actions, 
however, contemplate the primer that scientific theory must be based upon 
abstraction as a basis for replication of the reality, may be justified only on the 
ground of such factual discretion where human agents endeavor to develop 
inimitable capacity to abstract from learning. Yet, this abstraction seems 
apparent only when agents are exposed to the environment with which they 
interact and take corrective decisional choices, and invariably, then, the problem 
of choice inculpates. This problem of choice seems to generate biases and 
heuristics in decision making. To make things simpler for themselves, agents in 
general, examine attributions and search for some natural ‘equilibrium patterns’ 
that aims to offset frequency of errors in decisional choice. This is due to the 
fact that agents are able to identify contexts or patterns, where, patterns 
indicates order, and which refers to finding elements of unity among different 
situations or events similar to one experienced in past. This capacity to abstract 
in terms of perceptual recognition of contexts that help generalization of learned 
information about the complex world is related to the associative theories of 
storage, retrieval and learning, in addition to, the reinforcement model of 
learning- wherein, agents learn from interactions with their environment through 
trial-and-error. Since learning is a process that emerges from activity in a 
subjective and socially constructed world, the issue of embodiment in learning 
brings upon enduring changes at the aggregate level, which is perhaps, related to 
the situated nature of human cognition where cognition being a process inside 
the mind, is affected by mental states representing contextual aspects. Given that 
cognition is linked to perception and action, there exits definite 
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interrelationships between perception, action, behavior and goal wherein, action 
is required for perception in the same tune as goal is necessary for action in 
retrospect, whilst introspectively, action is required to achieve goals, if, and only 
if, those actions are backed by solid decisions framed on concerted policies that 
maximizes the utility function of actions. In effect, decision making process 
within economic organizations has been primarily based on the subjective 
expected utility theory which states that the decision maker chooses between 
risky or uncertain prospects by comparing their expected utility values. 
However, the probability of choice among decisions those agents will take on 
what decisional trajectory, may be determined by implicit policies, and pre-
determined values of such policy outcomes- as goal. In adeo, the agent actions 
are goal oriented; which provides the theoretical framework that sociocultural 
aspects of cognition and learning have certain intrinsic determinants (as value 
function defining good in the long-run). Also, rewards tend to determine the 
immediate inherent desirability of environmental states using value as a 
secondary variable in predicting and measuring reward of a state. But, as also, 
due to limited inter-temporal inferential capacity of the human brain that limits 
the ability to explore large amount of information all at a time (due to 
complexity of the environment) which however, led to the development by 
Herbert Simon the concept bounded rationality in 1976 where agents opt to 
utilize fewer variables (choice of actions) and less information to generalize facts 
and take efficient decisions by following stabilized rules. This implies the 
rational selection of variables not in terms of quantity, but in quality or value, 
since reward must have values as also, without reward, there would be no value! 
Hence, action choices are based on value judgments. However, value estimation 
is much difficult than reward determination since rewards are given directly by 
the environmental states. Reinforcement learning techniques, in these scenarios, 
can be applied as a method for efficiently estimating values by efficient use of 
function optimization and search methodologies. However, one complexity still 
gesticulate some convexities. This is, as usual, the representation of the 
probabilities of rule following to take solid decisions when patterns of 
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probabilities are uncertain. Under classical dynamics, this stability of rules as 
instances of representation and perceptions determine as well guide behavioral 
processes where rules stay in equilibrium as long as the system is unchanged. I 
provide an example in the next section on the nature of representation. Thus 
simply put, in terms of associative theories of learning, perceptual recognition of 
familiar objects or events on account of residual activation of representation 
where agents understands the relation between the presence and absence of cues 
or patterns, whether for lexical decision tasks or choice decisions in which, they 
have the options that allow them to select precisely among variables that 
increases the quantum of predictability of a system’s behavior with a higher 
degree of probabilistic acuity. This feature is apparently dissimilar from 
reinforcement learning which is goal directed learning from interactions eliciting 
a complex web of conditional behavior and interlocking goal-subgoal 
relationships that take advantage of experience to improve performance over 
time (temporality vector). This is more important in the context of expectation 
formation since agents often fail to derive rational outcomes under orthodox 
models where they face real problems while interacting with their environment 
to achieve goals. Invariably, it calls for adaptive expectations in the course of 
trial and error through search and reward on account of learning from 
interaction with the environment.  Reinforcement learning explicitly considers 
the ‘whole problem’ of a goal directed agent with an uncertain environment that 
exploits what it knows as also to explore in order to make better action 
selections in the future (discovering new actions). Elements of reinforcement 
learning consist of policy, reward function, value function and model of the 
environment where policy and reward functions are stochastic in nature. The 
above mentioned two complementary learning models when combined can be 
expressed as;   +. These models also allow agents in prediction and 
decision making. 
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   To quote in such continuum, the word ‘Learning’ can be conceptualized as the 
mechanism by which human beings attempt to realize the ‘unknown’ and 
discover the considerable body of knowledge hitherto indefinite, and which lies 
outside their concept a priori as predicate foreign to their concept. Here, 
knowledge may be defined as a condition of access to information defined as a 
state of knowing, and a capability of influencing action, being a path-dependent 
process (David, 1997, Rizzello, 2004), is a product to comprehend the reality, 
yet not illusion of reality, but explicit reality, where, the causality of conditional 
and relational aspects are understood in terms of cognitive consensuality (Gioia 
and Sims, 1986).  It is through the acts of logical reasoning, deductive analysis, 
pure criticism, theoretical discourse and judgmental inferences that the pure 
essence of empirical universality is established in our faculty of representation by 
which we are able to differentiate the knowledge absolutely independent of all 
experience a priori from that of a posteriori- the knowledge gained through 
experience. However, there arises the definite need for understanding the 
fundamental mechanism underlying neural basis of learning and mental 
representation. This is so because of the need to understand how individual 
mental and neurobiological idiosyncrasies affect decision-making process which 
accounts for the inclusion of feelings, motivation, and emotions in decision-
making processes. In order to provide neural explanation of agent behavior, it is 
essential to understand the neurobiology of mental representation and control of 
behavior as expressed as a series of movements and postures controlled by 
biological neural networks that generate differential patterns where, sensory 
inputs are analyzed and coordination is generated by the central neurons that 
precipitate the activation of a motor pattern. In the next section, I will provide a 
short background review within the scope of this paper, of few historical 
accomplishments that shaped the domain of evolutionary economics, and 
perhaps, provided a foreground for its newer sub-domain, cognitive economics 
which is now one of the most fertile interdisciplinary approach concerned with 
human learning and behavior. 
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II. Background Review 
The territory and the domains of economic science have expanded ever since the 
traditional intermingling of social disciplines (Psychology, Sociology, Political 
Science, etc.) to understand human nature in much broader perspectives. 
Economics being a normative science is much about social interactions and 
individual actions that determine material wellbeing of its subjects. This 
normative study of economic process is now past further than going beyond 
about market forces, resource allocation and equity in distribution that require 
both rational decision making while resources are scarce, as well, require human 
reasoning to foresee and solve problems of allocation and inefficiency. As such, 
there is genuine need for understanding economic agents’ behavior related to 
conditions of competitive equilibrium where normative and descriptive aspects 
of decision theory play a greater role in understanding the power of, and the 
lack of equity in distribution. There arise the necessity and advocacy of positive 
theories of economics (Friedman, 1953) related to policy-oriented decision 
making to be based on sound theoretical concepts which would shed light on 
core fundamental, critical and essential basic public issues (Simon, 1978). In 
effect, economic models are developed to simulate the real world dynamics and 
tested as computer based models taking into consideration economic agents’ 
preferences as experimental approach to detect the efficacy of policies that 
would, in otherwise, be impractical to test on real scenarios, considering the cost 
and temporal dimensions. In modeling economic scenarios, variables that are 
determined outside the model-exogenous, and those determined inside the 
model, are termed as endogenous. As such, models should consider taking into 
account optimal variables where they should be determined precisely, and in 
context. The contribution to the economic science of knowledge thus should be 
through good methods, where, it is important for the creator of these methods 
to perfectly theorize and refrain from meaningless fact gathering and piling of 
data end to end. There is genuine need for ordered search for empirical 
regularities and what should be avoided under these circumstances is-to theorize 
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without knowing it. When a model is conceived and implemented as a theory, it 
should be rigorously tested by additional facts to make it more systematic. This 
is exceedingly imperative since when economics is considered as a scientific 
discipline, the only true distinctive feature separating economic agents and that 
of natural sciences is the consistency of laws formulated to define the nature and 
relationship of matter and energy within some defined, fixed context as laws, 
which do not change. But as of in contrary to natural sciences, economic agents 
have differential preferences and choices which often do not follow discrete 
patterns giving rise to uncertainty. Hence to study the origin and nature of 
uncertainty and risk and to better understand agent externalities related to the 
existential generality of interdependencies between mind, matter, and their 
environment, it is prudent in reinforcing the pillars of cognitive sciences as an 
extended field of providing its machinery and tools to consider these problems 
holistically. 
 
   The Marshallian thought of parallelism detected between nature and workings 
of the mind and architectonic dynamics of organization in equilibrium 
confronted on several aspects of modeling systems that would foresee 
unexpected outcomes using dynamic equilibrium process, and his writings 
sought relevance of the mind to analyze organizations (Marshall, 1867-67, 
1890). Until that time, contemporary decision making was more allied to the 
expected utility theory which states that the decision maker chooses between 
risky or uncertain prospects by comparing their expected utility values (Mongin, 
1997). The question arises, whether decision makers always rely on 
probabilities? This pertains to the EUT process which has since been 
generalized using non-probabilistic decision theories since Allais (1953) 
invention of a thought-provoking problem widely termed as Allais paradox. 
Another inference is how to compute a system’s expected utility values or 
payoffs? Is it simply by adding the utility values of outcomes multiplied by their 
respective probabilities? Or, is it through the cognitive skills of human mind 
developed from learning processes of individuals that determines individual 
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agent’s payoff? While accounting for the problems of choice in decision making 
and given the computational and time limits of the internal environments, agents 
often incur systematic mistakes under a situation of strategic uncertainty. This 
was defined in Allai’s Paradox which violates the theory of expected utility. 
Then, in case of uncertainty, the question of probability does arise (as choices’ 
outcomes in terms of function of probability) whereas in case of risk, 
probabilities are not explicitly a part of agent’s decision problem (Mongin, 
1997). Thus, two standard distinctions of the theory appeared with one-
Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEUT) related to uncertainty, and the 
other, related to risk theory as the von Neumann-Morgenstern Theory 
(VNMT). However, these two theories raised questions on the limits of human 
rationality (uncertainty and risk) which led to the  development of Simon’s 
interdisciplinary approach in understanding decision making wherein, Simon’s 
work gathered momentum on economic agents’ rationality in decision making 
process. Although in terms of cooperative games as in ‘Nash Equilibrium’, 
repeated game learning matters where learning processes of individuals lead to 
Pareto efficiency. A Pareto outcome allows no wasted welfare; i.e., the only way 
one person’s welfare can be improved is to lower another person’s welfare. This 
may discretely lead to possibility of predetermining the outcome of repeated 
games with non-completely foreseeable trajectories (since determining all the 
possible paths and their value functions would be utterly complex, yet not 
unfeasible under procedural rationality).  As such, what I have attempted here is, 
to identify some definite patterns of trajectories and hence compute and 
optimize the total value function (value normalization) of a system given some 
possible trajectories by considering some amount of probability distributions for 
uncertain value functions, with some approximations, and simplifications. 
However, drawing definite trajectories may be easier, but assigning values to 
them is easier said than done, since, it’s these value functions which would likely 
determine the nature and characteristics of reward, added further, when choices 
are to be made under uncertainty and risky environment. This is generally 
described as value function normalization under the Prospect Theory-the theory 
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proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to model decision making under 
risk. In the Prospect Theory, choices among risky prospects are determined by 
replacing probabilities with decision weights. Applications of the Prospect 
Theory, where, biological and emotional dimensions into decision making are 
considered that make possible to determine functions of value, which is, by far, 
one of the mainstays of this theory. Thus, it may seem from the theory that to 
some extent, uncertainty and risk is itself a pattern and, by recounting the cost 
of uncertainty and risk is what that predominates by overweighting of low 
probabilities in both insurance and gambling. 
 
    In the realms of evolutionary economics, thus slowly yet steadily marched a 
few gathering of avant-garde economists, most notably, Alchian (1950), Hayek 
(1952), Carl Menger, Boulding (1956), Allais (1953), Kahneman and Tversky, 
and Social Psychologists, foremost among them, Herbert Simon, who 
confounded on the archetypical theories related to systems in equilibrium that 
aroused much debate on the clinical aspects of economic theory. They 
diagnosed lack of equilibrium in the equilibrium theory itself, that is, when a 
system is not in equilibrium, what rationality played on the part of the agents in 
decision making process? In understanding the structural characteristics and 
dynamics of organizations with an eye on decision making process invaluable to 
organization science, these critics raised questions on the limits of human 
rationality.   
 
     It should be mentioned here that the science of information processing is 
much based on the art of learning. Specific forms of adaptive learning to 
augment problem solving efficiency of different forms of hierarchical 
governance led to building formal models of organizations as information 
processing and problem solving entities. However, organizations faced some 
critical challenges while dealing with imperfect information as well; uncertainty 
related to payoff function of these new decision making models (Marengo et.al. 
2000). For example, the market economics of resource allocation related to the 
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problem-solving activities of a firm confronted on decision choice with respect 
to its product pricing, cost minimization and profit maximization where firms 
often face tough decisional choices when they find their profits shrinking, 
although with rising sales. Here, the crisis originates on account of defining 
organization behavior in a dynamic decision problem with diversity in decision 
rules while solving complex decision problems under uncertainty using models 
for drawing inferences about the nature, and the existence of a number of 
decision rules present in a system. More complexity props up while defining a 
system’s behavior considering the non-homogeneity in agent learning processes 
and heterogeneity in cognitive efforts among agents. Several studies noted (Bayer 
and Renou, 2011, Bracha and Brown, 2010, Houser et. al. 2004),  this 
instability of behavior in agents confronted with complex decision problems and 
the diversity in the types of decision rules agents use attempting to solve 
complex problems, often resulting in confusion and bias where, agents end up 
adopting suboptimal decision rules. These behavioral dispositions led to two 
arguments; possibly, accounting for the factor of risk and uncertainty related to 
choices among prospects weighted on probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979), and the other being, the limits of human rationality, that led to the 
development of the concept ‘Bounded Rationality’- as the destruens dimension 
of Herbert Simon’s contribution to neoclassical theory. Bounded rationality 
reduces the amount of variables to manage by using frugal heuristics, i.e., rules 
which uses just fewer variables and thus increases the capacity to generalize to 
deal with a complex world. This was not a straightforward as it became 
practically impossible to model such a system without considering the holistic 
dimensions of a system’s behavior, including that of its agents’ preferential 
diversities under representational spatiality underneath temporal domains. This 
problem did not go unheeded and well in the mid of twentieth century, Alchian 
(1950) led the foundation of evolutionary economics that marked the beginning 
of a new era which today presents a very large gamut of application. However, 
before this period, there arose the question of existential generality of 
interdependencies between mind and matter, and that of mentalism and 
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materialism that brought in the subjective treatments of feelings, emotion and 
motivations in decision making process, alongside, treating perception, memory 
and thinking in terms of cognitive psychology. Hayek’s (1952) model of mind 
certainly led to this consideration of transversal subjects in understanding more 
about the nature and evolution of organizations and institutions in a subjectivist 
framework of perception, knowledge and cultural evolution. The Neoclassical 
theory thus proved to be too counterintuitive is answering these notions1 
(Rizzello 2003) where contemporary economists avidly observed the persistence 
of inconsistencies related to absolute rationality in agent behavior. Also, there 
arose the question of whether equilibrium theory can still be considered a 
unifying theory. It is on this otter that I apply Markov decision process to 
understand the economics of marginal utility under differentiated choices by 
deriving a mathematical formulation for value function determination. 
 
III. On the Nature of Representation 
 
On the philosophy of contextual representation, agents may be faced with a 
problem representing its diverse contexts involving decision choices. Yet, all 
abstraction of these contexts through the act of analytical reasoning leads to two 
generalized events in natural sciences-the cause and its effect. Analysis of human 
analogical reasoning leads to inferences that distinguish arguments from a simple 
collection of propositions. In the eyes of philosophical thought, an argument 
inferentially derived from its premises as the truth of its conclusion can be 
represented as; 
                                                       P    I 
                           A                       Conclusion 
                                              Pr 
Propositions expressed by declarative sentences to describe human reasoning 
through mental acts of affirmation by judgments connecting truth of one 
proposition with the truth of another. Here, identifying contexts can make clear 
1Readers may refer to the series of CESMEP working papers by Rizzello, Novarese and Edigi (2003, 2004, and 2006) for 
some lucid accounts on the history of economic thought related to the domain of cognitive economics.  
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the direction of movement by directness of a path trajectory. In understanding 
the infinitesimal factuality of representation, it is thus essential to understand 
the structural features of logical arguments as well as methods of representing 
logical arguments. The general cause and effect principality can however, be 
represented by following an example that may represent the scenario of multiple 
contextuality, that is, a problem can solved by a single decision rule 
encompassing a diverse sub-methodological syntax but the result or goal would 
have to be the same. Reciprocally, a problem can be represented in diverse 
contexts to reach the same goal where the units of causes can be represented in 
various relations with respect to its effect. A simple mathematical example can 
be postulated; 7+5=12 or, 7+=12 can also be written as     . Where, 
the sum of a+b=c and where, a=7, b=5, and c=12. Here, a and b are both the 
causes of the effect c.2 However, the real effect ‘c’ may have a multiple or varied 
causes, but I content this study with this particular equation to analyze the 
causes with the goal of attaining the similar effect as for ‘c’. Here, for the given 
 causes a and b are set as a priori, or given, and ‘c’, the posteriori. The system so 
far is in equilibrium since all the causal variables are known. Each cause, ‘a’ and 
‘b’, may be represented in different contexts as they are made from i.e., each unit 
of one counts of seven gives 7 for a, as well for each unit of one makes 5 for b. 
This embodiment of the importance of contexts in real world in the faculty of 
our representation, where everything is described in nomological context where 
methods are engineered and designed as closed systems that are bounded by the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
To be noted, a is a and nothing else as well as for b and the c gives nothing but as stated product of the effects of a+b. From 
this representation, it seems that the law of this equation is bounded which is rational for which, there may be a fixed number of 
contexts to define either ‘a’ or ‘b’ while, the ‘c’ remains unchanged. Herein, if we assign the concept of cause b as unknown=, 
a requirement  7    12 to discover outside the concept of ‘a’ a predicate ‘b’ foreign to this concept (related to the concept as 
cause of ‘a’) is sought for, and solving for x gives   5. Now, a different representation of the context as given by 7+ ( 1  12 or 7    4  12 must be as a subproduct of the representation b=5 and nothing else so as 7  5  12. However, 
similarly, the cause may by represented as well by (  1  5  12 !"   1  5  12 wherein, the product of  1!"  1 must be, 7. While, a causality of 7    #  12 gives   #  5. Now by substituting 7  #  5  12 
yields the value for – #  0 and the rationality of 7    12 is established. Similarly, 7  &  '()  12 would require more 
methodic iterations to establish the empirical universality of ‘b=5’. Thus, the rules remain the same but the iterations and 
subrmethods may alter to attain the same goal. This is a simple example of multiple representational states of a single causality.  
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 nature of laws. It is by controlling these closed systems that we see laws without 
interferences through associations between measurable quantities or values. 
Hence, explaining contexts is a phenomenon of representational generalization 
where we may define a context (Ballinger, 2008) as ‘a contingent concept of 
conjecture under spatiotemporal circumstances with the presence of these 
conjectures in multiple factors as multiple chains of causations being path 
dependent’. This is an important deduction since; we can homogeneously reduce 
this definition as a foundational analog of ‘patterns’, which are, in essence, path 
dependent.                                                                                                      
 
IV. The Model 
A. Pattern recognition and Neurophysiology of Associative and Reinforcement 
Learning  
One of the primary foundational questions on interdisciplinary area involving 
agent behavior and cognitive science encompasses diverse areas of other 
scientific domains, i.e., behavioral psychology, neurophysiology, neuroscience, 
artificial intelligence, ethology, behavioral economics, and social anthropology. 
Thus, the domain of cognitive economics is becoming an assorted sphere that 
incorporates diverse new subjective domains into the economics jargon-evolving 
as ‘Neuroeconomics’. Neuroeconomics is hence, the study of the “mechanisms 
of how the embodied brain interacts with its physical external and biological 
internal environment to produce economic behavior”. This multidimensional 
approach enables investigators to undertake inquisitive research by providing 
some wide array of innovative tools to explore the fundamental questions 
involving cognitive sciences. Below is drawn a schematic representation of the 
science of Neuroeconomics and its related origins, which is just for the reference 
of readers, not an elaborate origin tree however. 
 
                                                <Diagram here> 
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        Chart1. Schematic representation of the evolution of Neuroeconomics 
 
The micro-architecture of neural network in the human brain undergoes 
evolutionary adaptation in response to higher brain functions related to 
reasoning and pattern recognition and complex cognitive computations (of 
thinking and conation). We shall see in the next section how ‘Glial Cell Theory’ 
contributes to this fascinating phenomenon of cognitive evolution in hominids. 
Since the overall number of neuron populations tends to remain same or 
diminutive with no new neuronal growth, the newly established role of glial cells 
seem to compensate for the general loss of synaptic connections. In the course 
of re-establishing new connections among the existing neurons by forming new 
synapses and interneuron networks, it facilitates nerve impulse conduction and 
impulse routing among newly available synapses that aid in complex functional 
efficiency of the brain. 
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A. Associative Learning and Reinforcement Learning; Agent-based Model 
The fundamental theory of Reinforcement Learning method is based on the 
principles of learning to maximize efficiency through trial and error which is 
selectional in character and where, agents’ interactions with the environment 
improve their performance over time. It is based on learning from interaction. 
Biological evolution produces organisms with skilled behavior. However, 
evolutionary methods like supervised learning methods are different from 
reinforcement methods of learning in a sense that, reinforcement models 
incorporate planning into the learning system, while supervised systems involved 
control theory of associations as tasks under conditions of complete knowledge, 
as opposed to R.L. In evolutionary models, there is not association, but 
selection methods. It allies more on function optimization and search methods 
like genetic algorithm and simulated annealing. By sensing the environment, 
agents choose actions to influence their environment. In supervised method, 
learning is associative and not by selection. However, John Holland’s ‘General 
Theory of Adaptive Systems’ is based on selectional principles where, Holland’s 
(1986) classifier systems consists of a true reinforcement learning systems 
including association and value function. A typical explanation given by 
Thorndike (1911) based on trial-and-error learning methods in animals 
proposed the Law of Effect which consisted of selectional and associative 
aspects of learning. Ron Holland (1960) instituted the policy iteration method 
for Markovian Decision Process (MDP), a model of Bellman where optimal 
return function can be computed from a dynamic programming. The 
components of R.L. method incorporate policy, reward function, value function 
and the model of the environment. Agents generally observe states and decide on 
an action. Following actions, they observe the new state and recognize reward 
thus learning from experience where the process is repeated altogether. A general 
example involving MDP model of R.L. can be given involving decision choices 
and discrete actions that is followed by a reward function. This is formally 
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modeled after Puterman’s (1995) MDP model3; a simple straightforward model 
may be stated as; 
 
 
                          1                                   1 
                                                                                                                           1 
                                                                  1                                        
                                                      2                     -500                                 20       
                          
 
For MDP,  a set of States, actions and reward function is defined by; 
 
1. A set of states ‘S’  as S=*+,, + … . +/0  
2. A set of actions ‘A’  as  A=*,,  … . 10 
3. Reward functions           R: S×A×S→ℜ 
There are 3 policies for this MDP; 
1. 0 →1 →3 →5 
2. 0 →1 →4 →5 
3. 0 →2 →4 →5 
Now, based on the policies, reward function can be computed from the above 
diagram as; 
1. 0 →1 →3 →5 = 1 + 1 + 1 = 3 
2. 0 →1 →4 →5 = 1 + 1 + 20 = 22 
3. 0 →2 →4 →5 = 2 –500 + 20 = -478 
I define a more complex model of the above MDP method with multiple 
decision states and with complex reward functions; (See appendix for function 
tables). The schema below is a topology diagram of a decision-reward which is 
however, not all inclusive of back-propagating state-function policies. For the 
simplicity of the context, I have kept the set of actions and reward function 
limited which however, may be expanded to a maximum of 37 forward 
propagating policies. 
 
1 
3 
0 
2 
5 
4 
A 
A 
B 
A 
A 
B 
A 
3Readers can refer to a presentation on Reinforcement Learning guide by Bill Smart, 2005 at this address: 
http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~wds/  
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      Fig.1 General Topology of a Reinforcement Learning Model with State, Action, Decision and Reward Function  
 
In the above depicted topology model of a decision-reward system, the overall 
observable states and their value functions are given. Agents are required to 
decide on trajectory for action and observe reward in a continuous trial-and-
error basis until they find the best actions as decision rules that generate 
maximal reward from the system. As an example of R.L., all actions starts from 
state ‘0’ defined henceforth as set of states S=*S1  S2. . . Sn0.This model may in 
the simplest of form represent a neural network however, without feedback 
actions (back-propagation). Although the model could be more complex by 
placing arrows between states which have been omitted, but given the 
complexity of task, this seems optimal in this context. The function tables (see 
appendix) provides policy table and their value functions for each action to be 
followed by agents. The states and values are distributed more or less randomly 
between the policy trajectories to seek out patterns among outcomes. There are 
14 states and 22 possible policies in the model (many more can be conceived). 
Each of the agents may follow only one policy at a time, and subsequently, by 
following a particular class of policies through trial-and-error method, agents 
0 
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learn about the efficiencies of both an individual policy and a class of policies 
that tends to maximize their reward values, and thus enhance the reward 
functions.  Applying the above reward function variables, I perform statistical 
computations to find correlations among individual policies (not reported) and 
their classes as well, obtain the summary statistics on the value and reward 
functions. The mean and standard deviation of the total reward functions in the 
system based on 22 policies defined are given in the appendix; I find certain 
interesting patterns among the states when they are assigned as variables i.e., a, b, 
d, e, f and arbitrarily, c and g. The total value of the system when summing up 
from given values assigned to different states is 5  ∑ 5,,  …	6, ,/ is 
85, where, Xn is the additional policy values. Following certain policies, agents 
can maximize their rewards and on three occasions, the policies yield 103, 112 
and 114 correspondingly. I define policy pattern classification (PPC) by 
identifying the symmetrical nature of policy directions that would lead to 
reward functions. These policies may be grouped and characterized as: 
 
1. (a1+a2)=12+74=86 
2. (b1+b2+b3)=-36+5+67=36 
3. (d1+d2+d3)=75-4+13=84 
4. (e1+e2+e3)=-12+3+65=56 
5. (f1+f2+f3)=-3+13+76=86, and 
6. (g1+g2+g3)=112+103+114=329 
Total Reward Values unlocked by agents (patterned): 892 (or 96.85%)  
Let us define the functions in terms of mathematical expressions as; 
 
                                   Ρ=8,  8 … /                               (1) 
Then, I may define in terms of definite integral the sum of policy functions as, 
 
                                9    8,  8 … /:,                          
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                                                                                                      (2) 
Now, all the product of the sum of policy variables is to be defined in terms of 
positive integer variables by the following formula 
 
                                           ;cos sin@ =A                             (3) 
 
Where,                           Ρ  8,  8 … /   
                    
I derive the values of policy functions from (3) as; 6.0765, 6.0082, 6.4784, 
7.7332, 6.0765 and 7.76 respectively. Now let us define the equation for 
rationalizing the value functions in terms of products. The equation is defined 
as,  
 
                                           sin ∑ ∑ 5	,6	6,                                      (4) 
 
Where, 5  g1  g2  g3, highest value from all the variables. 
 
By combining (2) and (4), and where, 8,  8 …  / are additional 
policies, I derive 
                 9    8,  8  8D  8E  8F  8G:,  sin ∑ ∑ 5	,6	6,             
                                                                                                             (5) 
The agents generally have expectations value where, their expectation is a 
function of probability under linearity of time domain. Under linear time-
invariant system, bounded inputs produces a bounded output, as such, I 
consider that the agents’ expectations are rational. I derive the functional part of 
the equation from Laplace transformation where, the probability density 
function ƒ is given by, 
 
                                         Hƒ+  J;KLM@                                   (5.1) 
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Laplace transformation is used for solving boundary value problems. In this 
context, it is necessary to derive a function which can determine the conditional 
probabilities of additional policies in terms of payoff value. In stochastic process 
such as Markov chains, ‘s’ is applied as Laplace transform to move in-between 
time domains and where, the Laplace variable ‘s’ is the operator variable in the L 
domain to determine the linearity of time domain. This is based on a model 
proposed by McFarland (1970) to derive mathematical analogy of motivational 
systems using topological methods of systems analysis. Using inverse Laplace 
transform, functions of time are transformed into functions of ‘S’, (ƒ).A linear 
dynamical system is given by; 
  ƒN  HL, *O+0PQRST UN  HL,*V+0 
 
The formula for solving dynamic equations on time scales is given by, 
 WX*|Z|0  W*;Z  1@Z  1  
 
In equation (14), I define the function in terms of  
The optimal value function equation is given by modifying the ƒ as 9  [RS[\, . 
To define the time domain of the probability density function, the agents 
expectation value should be rationalized, and this may be modified in order to 
include time-bound variances in the first passage times of Markovian stochastic 
chain where it is defined by absolute convergence of the Laplace transform in a 
linear dynamical system, and I modify 9  [RS[\,  as, 9  [RR
S]S ^_
[LRS]S \[ . This would 
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further rationalize probability distribution among the variables. I define the 
optimization equation as, 
 
                                  5    sin   `ab c/c\c                               (6) 
 
Where,  9    8,  8 … /:, , and,  ∑ ∑ 5	,6	6,  
respectively. By substituting the variables in (6), the final optimal value function 
equation thus stands as, 
 
d    8,  8 … /:,  sin e e 5
	
,6
	
6,
 sin ∑ ∑ 5	,6	6,Psin ∑ ∑ 5	,6	6,  sin ∑ ∑ 5	,6	6, T            7 
 
 
Where, the optimality modulator is defined as  in 9    8, :,8 … /  of equation (2). Now, again by solving (6) as polynomials, I obtain 
 
                                         5  `ab c\f\,                                      (8) 
 
Substituting the variables in (8), I derive, 
 2 g sinP∑ ∑ 5	,6	6, T  2 h9    8,  8 … /:, h2  1 
                                                                                                     (9.1) 
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2 g sin ie e 5	,6
	
6, j  2 kd    8,  8 … /
:
, k  1 
                                                                                                             (9.2) 
 
   From equation (9), we derive the optimal efficiency of agents as reward value 
gained by each of the agents as 44.66 for the full system, close to our real value 
of 41. Given by the equation (9.2), in order to compute the percentage 
probability of reward values to be obtained by the agents by following patterned 
policy choices after all forward-propagating state policies that can be derived 
from the system have been computed, we derive a value of 88.33% or 
conversely, 12% for non-patterned policy functions. To be noted, in our 
previous computation with real values (See Table 1), the total reward values (as 
%) gained by the agents while following patterned policy actions was 96.85%. 
Whilst, to determine the total unrealized value of the system had all the policies 
been implemented, it is possible to derive approximation by modifying the 
equation (6) slightly as; 
 
                                             5  sin   2  1                             (10) 
Where, 
+lm ie e 5	,6
	
6, j  2 kd    8,  8 … /
:
, k  1 
 
                                                                                                           (11)  
By equation (11), we get an efficiency of 78.28% or 721.23, while the primary 
derivation from equation (7) is 676.23, the lowest possible value that can be 
derived from the system, and whereby, substituting (10), we get;                                                                                                       
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5  +lm ie e 5	,6
	
6, j  kd    8,  8 … /
:
, k
 kd    8,  8 … /:, k  1 
                                                                                                              (12) 
the maximum total reward value that the agents can realize in close 
approximation given the similar state and value functions from all possible 
policy actions(without backward propagation) is 1353.39 from (12), whilst 
from(11), we derive 721.33 as reward values. Now, the initial reward value 
computed from all the 22 policy functions is 921. Thus, the maximum possible 
reward value which agents will be able to derive when every possible state policy 
is covered, V=721+921=1642, which is, and in approximation, the real value 
maximization of the system using all network trajectories. This approach is 
much based on the method of frugal heuristics to determine tautomeric 
equilibrium of boundary value problem using variations of Laplace functions, 
where, it may be possible to determine such unknown total value to be realized 
from a system. A possible application could be in the field of oil and energy 
sectors, wherein, it might aid in determining the approximate total global or 
regional reserves of crude oil or gas given some of the known reserve values as 
policy functions, although, similar methods are usually applied statistically to 
solve such problems. This method may also aid to develop parallel homeostatic 
systems related to quantitative predictions about behavior of a system. Thus, I 
am able to derive the iterated product from (9.2) using a similar, yet modified 
expression using, the parameter ∏ 5	6,  for optimization vector,    
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                               o=p,\q∏ rstsuS \
∏ vs^w∏ vstsuS xtsuS ∏ vstsuS yz
{
∏ rstsuS  
                                                                                                                (13) 
Where, o is defined as optimization parameter as the iterated function for value 
optimization for a given number of value actions (/, that derive as the final 
optimization equation for this model: 
 2 g +lmP∑ 5	6, ∑ 5	6, T  ∑ 5	6, g &2 g h9    8,  8 … /[RS[\, h)
q1  |∏ 5	6,  ∏ 5  P∏ 5	6, T	6, ∏ 5	6, }y

∏ 5	6, ~/ 
                                                                                                              (14) 
Where, &2 g h9    8,  8 … /[RS[\, h) may be modified as 
2 g k9  [RRS]S ^_[LRS]S \[ k  8,  8 … /.  
Or, 
2 g +lm ie 5	6, e 5
	
6, j  e 5
	
6,
g
2 g k9  [RRS]S ^_[LL,:, \[ k  8,  8 … /∏ 5	6,  ~/ 
[27] 
 
                                                                                                              (15) 
 That gives value of 28 when /  87 or for,/  50, the system would 
optimize the value to 16, which is, somewhat rational given the complexity of 
the system. Some further optimization is possible when, 9  [RS[^S . The equation 
(14) that we derive from equation (8), we may call it  a general optimization 
value equation (GOVE) of a linear dynamical system which defines the 
probability factor by including a variance factor and does not allow for too large 
deviations in values, although, this is one of its flaws, since, it does not include 
any randomness in variables. Hence, I denote ‘~/’ as the modulator function 
for vector parametrization that can be modified to the system’s requirements as 
an integer function. From equation (15), it is possible to incorporate some 
amount of further linear optimization. There remains the question of how it 
would help identify the context of reinforcement learning model using the MDP 
method? 
 
• Can it be possible to represent the problem of choice that the agents face 
when they take actions under uncertain reward functions? 
• Can the outcomes of a learning function be determined in terms of agent 
productivity, or is it possible to know beforehand given a system’s total 
efficiency using Reinforcement learning method? 
• Another question to come into my mind: does R.L. enable or help 
enhance total ability in agents, considered only when ability across agents 
is not identical? 
     As far as this model specifies, I obtain several optimal values that are of real 
significance to determine the probability of unrealized state of value functions; 
both of patterned and unpatterned, suboptimal and optimal rewards as well as 
of the total rewards to be gained from a similar MDP system when outcomes 
are unknown. This paper in particular, tries to answer some queries upheld 
(Novarese, 2009) in terms of rationality of choosing a specific policy or goal.  
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Here, I consociate upon the uncertainty related to the question of the problem 
of valuation through selective choice of policy actions using the MDP model to 
understand what idiosyncrasies does any learning model or agents face, 
considering the fact that they have the limited capacity to use all the information 
present in a system, as also, to determine the efficiency of such policies 
undertaken. In conundrum, and in order to determine the efficiency of a specific 
goal pursued with predetermined actions and the real values associated with each 
policy actions, as well as to determine beforehand what would be the total 
realization in terms of reward or value had been those specific goals were 
pursued, would be, in terms of generalization, provide some deeper 
understanding of the behavior of policy actions and their effects on individual 
(groups) of agents. Agents would have been then, invariably following some 
definite (un)patterned policy actions (not) knowing their general outcomes in 
terms of reward realizations. It is of interest to cite that patterned processes are 
path dependent and selection of a particular path during a critical juncture 
period is marked by contingencies (Mahoney, 2000). It would become an 
entirely difficult endeavor to machinate mathematically to prove and establish 
with absolute precision of what path(s) an agent may follow which is, a 
temporal uncertainty based on behavioral heterogeneity, and the given finite 
nature of dimensionality of the finalities of path trajectory, where, the chaos 
theory seems to reconcile causation with contingencies by linking causally 
unpredictable outcomes to initial conditions (Ferguson, 1997, Tucker, 1999), 
which would have, otherwise reconciled to indeterminacy of these patterns.             
     
    Based on the value of actions where agents acquire reward while following 
individual policies, they can be classified according to the policy patterns that 
they follow, and their behavior distinctiveness may be ascertained, i.e., whether 
agents are risk averse or risk loving, since under experimental conditions, agents 
would invariably go for the best patterns by selecting optimal policies that 
would maximize their reward functions. Some inferential computed values 
derived from the rewards may be summarized in table 1(See Appendix). As like 
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with any other models, there are best performers and worst performers among 
agents guided by policy directions. In this model, the agents simply unlocked 
values of actions by maximizing on what they were given initially and gained 
rewards while following certain path oriented policies. The model specification 
of MDP thus established the efficacy of generating reward and gain value using 
Reinforcement learning method applying Markovian Decision Process (MDP). 
It is evident that from the model that patterns among policies is one of the 
prime determinant of value maximization strategies, or in other words, value 
maximizing policies follow not random order but patterned decision actions.  
However although, there are major limitations in this model as regard to the 
probabilities that an agent will choose a particular policy, the risk appetite of the 
agents, the choices between competing alternatives and the simplicity of the 
decision rules. I have deliberately omitted backward propagation loops among 
states that would have generated more number of policies given the values and 
would have given several new entangled policies, since, all the policies that the 
system may have is not explored, neither are their reward functions. Hence, I 
devised mathematical formulations to provide some proximity to the finalities of 
total value functions the system has, as policy finalities of each agents (Minsk, 
Farley and Clark, 1954). The efficacy lies in the fact that agents are able to 
exploit and explore to unlock value potential from a system given decisional 
choice (Novarese et. al. 2007) as a framework for decision making and, by 
following certain patterns of policies through trial-and-error or search and 
reward procedure. The MDP model also determines the optimality or sub-
optimality of decision choices and policy actions. 
 
     In nature, the dynamical behavior of agents is likely to be influenced by their 
interaction with the environment (other agents). Having options allow human 
agents to select precisely among variables (decision rules) which determines the 
direction of a path trajectory while solving complex problems.  However, the 
technique of thinking that determines human reasoning which helps to ascertain 
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the ‘patterns of thinking’ require establishing the empirical universality of a 
process or knowledge which is quite complex and bewildering.   
 
V. Discussion 
The above model simplifies the value determination problem of a learning 
system as also, mathematically, proves the computational derivations that were 
obtained from the 22 policy functions. However, in all total 15 more policy 
functions may be conceived out of this model making a total of 37 (not 
reported). The equations’ probability determination capability needs particular 
mention- computing the probability of a complex system’s behavior when some 
of its variables are unknown, which is, in-fact, not in exactitude, but in 
approximation, relatively comprehensible. When a system becomes too complex 
and some of its variables remain undefined, it may be represented 
mathematically to study the distributive patterns of both of its known and 
unknown variables under uncertainty. This rationalization in terms of behavioral 
neurobiology of decision and choice modeling simulations for general 
abstraction in problem solving characterizes cognitive capabilities of human 
agents who are thus, able to apply a varied array of decision rules and strategies 
when solving complex decisional problems. This also characterizes the essential 
features of motivated behavior which is intentional, voluntary, and purposively 
goal directed where agents have expectancies and incentive factors related to the 
nature of tasks that they undertake. They develop and apply models for drawing 
inferences about the nature and complexity of the problems that they face and 
this creates the existence of diversity in decision rules present in a population. 
Comparative analogy can be drawn from Southwood (1981) who suggests that 
it may be due to apostatic selection in maintaining aspect diversity that defines 
the variations in genetic constituent of agents in defining the theory of the 
dynamics of biological populations. In similar anthropomorphic vein, cognition 
plays an essential role in the analysis of motivation and emotion as in the mind’s 
capacity to deal with information, including its reception, storage, processing 
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and retrieval that require energy. Since agents have certain expectancies, 
motivational energy is required to activate the internal states to meet those 
expectancies. This theory is derived from Atkinson-McClelland model of 
expectancy and value which underlines the nature of cognitive processes involved 
in achievement motivation. Agents in general, require internal ability or effort on 
a given task. Since ability across agents is relatively stable, the level of effort 
fluctuates. In a path-dependency process, success as value or reward stems from 
ability or the quantum of effort that agents put in. In a learning system such as 
reinforcement learning, agents uncover the true value of a path or policy through 
trial-and-error; where, repeated failure leads to success. This stems from the 
extra efforts that agents are required to take in order to examine attributions of 
the causes of performance by identifying the set of alternative responses and 
consequences of each response. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        + 
 
 
 
 
                                                                Or 
 
                                           Fig.2The Ability-Effort-Motivation Cycle 
     Roget (1834), came closer in defining cognition as a materialistic 
representation of higher brain function way back in the nineteenth century 
through his following quotation- ‘the brain is the material instrument by which 
 Agents Given Tasks 
           Ability             Effort 
    Success     Failure 
        
Motivation 
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we retrace and combine ideas, and by which we remember, we reason, we invent’. 
The above MDP model somewhat mimics neural network of a human brain that 
throw some light on the cognitive aspects of decision process analogous to 
computer models based on ANN which is based on pattern recognition, feature 
extraction, matching and extrapolation. Modern new learning machines are 
being developed based on the concept of adaptive neural network where 
machines have the programmed ability to learn new behavioral patterns, receive 
and compare new stimuli with previously stored information, retain this new 
information and modify its behavior when situation demands-a feature, that 
provides some degree of cognitive ability. In the field of biomechanics, robots 
are being devised to mimic human capabilities using these ANN to achieve 
neuroeconomic efficiency in operation due to better motor coordination using 
Reinforcement learning techniques and the theory of backward-propagation. 
Relatively new contributions to this literature of cognitive neuroeconomics 
states that under some experimental conditions, memory do not affect outcomes 
and fails to explain individual performance (Novarese, 2009) while in-fact, it is 
the conceptual understanding and perceptual representation of states that often 
alter experimental outcomes. Since brain’s storage capacity for all humans are 
architectonically same, learning through search-trial-and-error based model of 
R.L. may enhance the brain’s network utilization capacity and thus, may increase 
long-term memory. For some agents, the process of learning is random at the 
beginning and more stable as time passes by when new information is acquired 
that helps to develop stable associations between sequences and responses. 
Functional complexity levels of environmental states and interrelationships 
among them may induce the brain to utilize more of its unused network by 
establishing new connecting patterns of neural network as a basis for controlled 
programming of neural adaptive behavior. This may be important in the context 
that patients with cognitive disabilities (Beauchamp et.al., 2008) and amnesia 
induced by neurodegenerative diseases like Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s may 
benefit from therapeutic learning- a concept considered to be beneficial in 
limiting further memory loss, perhaps, by expanding the network transmission 
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capacity through re-establishing lost connections among neuroglial cells in the 
brain when pharmacologic agents fails to alleviate the pathology. 
 
Neurobiological Implications: 
 
Knowledge about how the brain interacts with its external environment to 
produce economic and rational behavior will further aid economic decision 
makers and social scientists to understand the variation in individual decision 
making, and to make better choices under uncertainty. Here, I would consider 
some deeper understanding related to the subjective matter of neuroscience, 
without which, I believe, it will not endure such justification to this new domain 
of neuroeconomics. The human brain is a complex organic computer composed 
of 100 billion neurons with 100 trillion connections among them. On average, 
about 50,000 neurons die or atrophy each day between the ages 20-75, 
shrinking the size of the brain by 10% by the time one reaches the age of 75. 
Studies indicate that neurogenesis causes less anxiety as well as enhanced 
learning and memory formation in adult rodents. The functional domains of 
human and rat brains are somewhat similar giving the advantage of performing 
detailed analytic study using fMRI or functional magnetic resonance imaging 
that simulate much of the higher functions of human brain. There are certain 
areas in the brain that are associated with the cognitive, reasoning, spatial 
learning, reward and pleasure functions. The hippocampal region is associated 
with spatial learning while the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex relates to reasoning, 
the ventral striatum associated with reward and pleasure, and the orbital frontal 
cortex being associated with processing of emotions. The association cortex in 
the human brain is responsible for high level of cognition. Of particular 
importance is the role of basal ganglia, an old mental structure also found in 
reptiles associated with special task performance providing the mental strength 
necessary to reduce the quantum of information processed in the human brain. 
Human cognitive functions can thus be functionally classified into; complex 
pattern recognition, reasoning and higher level of problem solving skills.  
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   It is important to establish the factuality of the theory of whether glial cell 
formation depends on the ability of the human nervous system to recognize 
pattern. Higher pattern recognition or cognitive functions stimulate glia cell 
proliferation with the combined influence of neural factors, biochemical, 
electrical and physiological events which are both exogenous and endogenous. 
Determinants of new glial cell formations are stimulated by Ca influx, nerve 
impulse generation, quantum of action potential, adenosine release, and 
information processing which are modulated by the temporal factors in learning, 
the nerve cell and synapse populations as well as by memory formation. The 
neuro-physiological basis of pattern recognition is a function of nerve cell 
conduction frequency, Ca influx, adenosine release (Guthrie, 1999), the 
mechanisms which are disrupted in some of the diseases related to demylineating 
and neurodegenerative amnesic pathogenesis like Multiple Sclerosis, Alzheimer 
disease (Forman et.al., 2004), Parkinson’s and Myasthenia Gravis, or, in 
mitochondrial and calcium ion transport disorders that severely impair 
information processing capacity of the brain and leads to nerve conduction 
disorders. Memory retention and pattern recognition ability of the brain also 
depend on the population of synapses and neurons which also stimulate glial cell 
formation, perhaps by some other unknown mechanisms yet fully not 
understood. Peter T. Lansbury (1992) showed in culture Petri-dishes that 
excessive build-up of an entangled  protein plaque similar to A-Beta molecule 
carved out of the APP(amyloid-beta precursor protein) are toxic to neurons 
which interfere with processes critical to learning and memory formation in rats 
and may thus be the reason behind cognitive decline in patients with 
Alzheimer’s disease. In Parkinson’s disease, destruction of neurotransmitter 
dopamine secretion neurons in the substantia-nigra region of the brain causes 
involuntary tremors and impaired motor coordination and balance which are 
among the disease’s hallmarks (Lang and Lozano, 1998). Using modern 
scientific tools, researchers are now able to characterize the neurochemistry of 
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altered mental states whereby, analyzing the causes of abnormal behavior and 
impaired cognition have become possible. 
 
   Higher analytical reasoning function like Pattern recognition capability may 
also be determined by the constant population of neuron and synapses as well as 
by the fixed amount of memory and information processing capacity of the 
brain at any given time. It may be theoretically assumed that higher pattern 
recognition capacity would lead to more glial cell formation in the brain. In the 
adult brain, the number of glial cell outnumbers that of neurons by a ratio of 
9:1. However, it is not clear since at constant glial cell population, it may be 
mathematically represented that the synaptic and neuron population remains 
constant as a function of 
                         G  e abS  bbO`/6, ,k          (15) 
 
   Learning induces and stimulates glial cell proliferation which further aid in 
controlled programming of neural adaptive behavior. The theory of neural 
control of behavior was explained vividly by Bently and Konishi (1978) There 
is a definite relationship between glial cell proliferation and memory formation. 
Thus, higher cognitive analytical functions like pattern recognition seem to be 
more simulative and directly related to glial cell formation, but not to new 
neurons, since, neurons once damaged do not seem to regenerate. However, 
pattern recognition capability is enhanced due to glial cell development; learning 
and memory, which have mutually neural, electrical and biochemical properties 
as well incorporates patho-physiological principles. Then the question remains 
whether physiological, electrical and biochemical properties induce glial cell 
formation? What other determinants help better pattern recognition adaptability 
of human brain? 
 
B. Role of Glial Cells 
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One primary question is, whether pattern recognition capacity is directly related 
to the amount of V or glial cell population in the brain? Model of higher brain 
functions reveal the role of glia that influence the formation of synapses and 
thus help determine strength of neural connections and neural algorithms. 
Intercommunication mechanism among neurons and glial cells is the theory 
behind cognitive learning and storing long-term memory. The memory recall 
process of human brain is similar to retrieving records that match a pattern like 
a batch file or registry function in computers. Glial cells are typically of two 
types; astrocytes and oligodendroctyes or Schwann cells. It is presumed that glial 
cells contribute to information processing in the brain through detection of 
signaling among glial cells. In the human brain, the glial cells outnumber 
neurons by a ratio of 9:1. Previously, glial cells were thought to be associated 
with the maintenance role of bringing nutrients from blood vessels to neurons as 
also, in preserving the ionic balance in the brain. But glial cells lack the 
membrane properties required to actually propagate their own action potentials 
for which, neurons are best suited for. Electrical impulses called action 
potentials induce neuronal cells to release neurotransmitters (acetylcholine, 
dopamine, serotonin, 5-HT etc.) across synapses. Earlier work on the 
hypothesis that calcium influx into the glial cells led to stimulation resulted in 
the development of a method called calcium imaging to test whether glial cells 
are sensitive to stimulations (Smith 1990, Kater 1996). Analysis of voltage-
sensitive ion channels in glia also reveals that glia cells sense similar electrical 
signals in axons. However, glia relies on chemical messengers (signals) instead of 
electrical ones to convey messages. Glial cells usually detect neuronal activity 
through a variety of receptors on their membranes through which they 
communicate with neurons and each other. It is also interesting to note that glia 
influences synapse formations and also alter signals at the synaptic gaps between 
neurons.  
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    The mechanism of information processing in the brain depends on some 
wide underlying physiological phenomenon related to nerve cell conduction and 
impulse transduction of action potentials, neurotransmitter release and synaptic 
network in the brain. New synapse formation may be related to learning and 
memory development and need for analytic reasoning capabilities of the human 
brain which may be directly related to glial cell proliferation while in neural 
coding, neuro-spatial conduction of nerve impulse threshold of differential 
frequency do not alter synapse formation. It has been established by (Stevens 
et.al. 2002) that a neurotransmitter adenosine (from breakdown of ATP) release 
from astrocytes is one of the factors in new synapse formation as well as in 
myelination. Then, it is highly probable that certain enzymes stimulate or 
inhibit new synapse formation by activation of new genes that regulate synapse 
formation. In some diseases, synapses are destroyed by specific intracellular 
mechanism by the action of proteases that leads to abnormal nerve impulse 
conduction syndromes.  So, the brain or some intracellular mechanisms 
determine the optimal level of glial cell requirement for building synaptic 
networks (neural network) required for higher analytical functions related to 
higher order pattern recognition and reasoning. This function is induced by 
triggering on specific genes and enzyme activation within the cell nucleus as to 
determine how many more synapses are to be required for neural coding of 
analytical functions and forming neural network  (glia-axon) with the existing 
neurons by increasing the number of synaptic junctions. These are analogous to 
logic gates in computer architecture for information processing of nerve impulse 
conduction across the, association cortex, thalamus, hippocampus, S1 area, 
PSSC, that greatly increases the ability of neural network for information 
processing functions. Then, what would be the effect of rapid neuron or glial 
cell depletion on cognitive efficiency? The answer perhaps lies in some proteins 
which behave faultily in the human body, or, there may have other causes i.e. 
stress and environmental factors that induce genetic mutations giving rise to bad 
proteins. Thus, on the nature of the evolutionary thought of human decision-
making integrating computational theories of mind, where, conceptual issues 
[38] 
 
related to cognitive sciences and the problem of choice can be dealt more 
interestingly when we learn further about how our brain functions. Perhaps in 
time to come, advanced technology may develop novel machines and biomedical 
interventions to deal with the Quantum Brain Hypothesis(Kuljis, 2010) and 
other interesting topics like digital nootrophins (artificial digital memory 
enhancers?) to enhance the power of human cognitive dimensions, both in 
normal and disordered cognition in humans. More research is needed hence in 
the field of “Molecular Neuroeconomics” for a more interdisciplinary 
integration toward a coherent understanding of human behavior and human 
decision-making to solve some unresolved dilemmas. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The general conclusion that can be drawn from this study is the efficiency factor 
of reinforcement learning, and how agent-based modeling applying MDP 
method may aid in better decision choice and actions taken by such agents. This 
study also re-establishes the importance of pattern recognition among policy 
options and in-efficiency of random actions for reward accumulation. This 
method may be further enhanced by inducting a better model incorporating 
unknown variables as values that would help identify specificity in agent 
behavior as well, decipher the risk aversion and risk appetite of agents under 
action. Application domains can be expanded to other interdisciplinary fields 
like predicting the price trend of crude oil as well as reserve capacity accounting 
when given possible states having diversity of actions and value choices. On this 
frontier, I have thus undertaken an interdisciplinary approach involving, 
although, in better part, the “neural” aspects of economic decision making by 
reinforcing the pillars of the subjective domain of Neuroeconomics.⁪  
 
 
 
[39] 
 
References: 
 
• Alchian, A. (1950) ‘Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory’, Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 58: 211-221. 
• Allais, M. (1952), “Le comportament de l'homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique 
des postulats de l'école Américaine”, Econometrica, 21, pp. 503-46. 
• Arthur, W. Brian. (2005). Paper prepared for Handbook of Computational Economics, 
Vol. 2: Agent-Based Computational Economics, K. Judd and L. Tesfatsion, eds, 
ELSEVIER/North-Holland. 
• Arthur, W. Brian., Durlauf, Steven, and Lane, David. (1997). The Economy as an 
Evolving Complex System II. Introduction to the volume. 
• Atkinson, J.W. (1957). ‘Motivational determinants of risk-taking behavior’. 
Psychological Review, 64; 359-372. 
• Bayer, C- Ralph, and Renou, Ludovic. (2011). Cognitive abilities and behavior in 
strategic-form games.University of Leicester, Department of economics, Working Paper 
no. 11/16. 
• Beauchamp M.H., Dagher A., Panisset, M. and Doyon, J. (2008). Behavioural 
Correlates of Cognitive Skill Learning in Parkinson’s Disease, The Open Behavioral 
Science Journal, 2008, 2, 1-12. 
• Bem, D.J., and Allen, A.(1974) On predicting some of the people some of the time. 
Psychological Review, 81, 506-520. 
• Bently, David., Konishi, Masakazu.(1978). Neural control of behavior. Ann. Rev. 
Neurosci. 1:35(59). 
• Bracha, Anat, Brown J. Donald; (2010) Affective Decision Making: A Theory of 
Optimism Bias, Fed. Res. Bank Boston Working Paper no. 10-16. 
• Clint Ballinger. 2008. Classifying Contingency in the Social Sciences: Diachronic, 
Synchronic, and Deterministic Contingency, Cambridge University Paper. 
• Come H. Jon, Fraser E. Paul, Lansbury T. Peter, JR: 1993. A kinetic model for amyloid 
formation in the prion diseases: Importance of seeding: Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA Vol. 
90, pp. 5959-5963, July 1993, Biophysics. 
• D.J. McFarland. (1970). Behavioral aspects of homeostasis’. Advances in the study of 
behavior, vol. 3, 1-26. 
• David P. (1997) Path - Dependence and the Quest for Historical Economics: One 
More  Chorus of the Ballad of QWERTY. Discussion Paper in Economic and Social 
History. Oxford: University of Oxford.  
[40] 
 
• Dosi, G., Faillo, Marco., Marengo, Luigi., Moschella, D. (2011). Modeling routines and 
organizational learning. A discussion of the state-of-art. Laboratory of economics and 
management, Sant’ Anna School of Advanced Studies, Italy, Working Paper Series, 
2011/04. 
• Egidi M (2002), "Biases in Organizational Behavior", in M Augier and J.J. March (eds),  
The Economics of Choice, Change and Organization: Essays in Memory of Richard M. 
Cyert, Aldershot, Edward Elgar. 
• Ferguson, Niall. 1997. Virtual history: Towards a ‘chaotic’ theory of the past. In 
Virtual history: Alternatives and counterfactuals, Niall Ferguson ed. London: Picador. 
• Fields, R.D., Stevens-Graham, B. 2002. New Insights into neuron-glia communication, 
Sience: Vol. 298, 556-562.  
• Forman, S. Mark, Trojanowski, Q. John, Lee, M-Y Virginia, 2004. Neurodegenerative 
Diseases: A decade of discoveries paves the way for therapeutic break-through. Nature 
Medicine, Vol. 10, 1055-1063. 
• Friedman M. (1953), Essays in Positive Economics, The University Press, Chicago. 
• Hall, A.D., and R.E. Fagen (1956), “Definitions of a System”, in L. von Bertalanffy and 
A. Rapoport (eds.), General Systems: Volume I. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press.   
• Hayek, F.A. (1952). The Sensory Order. An Inquiry into the Foundations of 
Theoretical Psychology, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
• Heider, F. (1944). Social perception and phenomenon causality. Psychological Review, 
51: 358-373.  
• Holland J.H., K. Holyoak. (1986), R. Nisbett, P. Thagard, Induction, MIT Press. 
• Houser, Daniel, Keane, Michael, and McCabe Kevin (2004); Behavior in a dynamic 
decision problem: An analysis of experimental evidence using a bayesian type 
classification algorithm. Econometrica: Vol. 72, 781-822. 
• Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, Amos. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision 
under risk. Econometrica, Vol.47, No. 2, 263-292. 
• Kuljiš O. Rodrigo:(2010) Integrative Understanding of Emergent Brain Properties, 
Quantum Brain Hypotheses, and Connectome Alterations in Dementia are Key 
Challenges to Conquer Alzheimer's Disease. Front Neurol. 2010; 1: 15. PMCID: 
PMC3008926 
[41] 
 
• Lang A.E., Lozano, A.M. 1998. Parkinson’s disease, Parts 1and 2. New England Journal 
of Medicine, Vol.339, 1044-1053 and  1130-1143. 
• M. L. Puterman. Markov Decision Processes. Wiley, 1994.  
• Mahoney, James. 2000. Path dependence in historical sociology.  Theory and Society 
29:507-548 
• Marengo, L., G. Dosi, P. Legrenzi and C. Pasquali (2000), “The Structure of Problem-
Solving Knowledge and the Structure of Organizations”, Industrial and Corporate 
Change, 9, 757-788. 
• Marshall, A. (1867-8), Ye Machine, in Raffaelli (1994).  
• Marshall, A. (1890), Principles of Economics, London: MacMillan. 
• Mongin, Philippe; Expected Utility Theory Handbook of Economic Methodology (J. 
Davis, W. Hands, and U. Maki, eds.  London, Edward Elgar, 1997, p. 342-350). 
• Novarese, Marco and Lanteri, Alessandro. 26 April 2007. Individual learning: theory 
formation, and feedback in a complex task Centre for Cognitive Economics, Universit`a 
Amedeo Avogadro: MPRA Paper No.3049. 
• Novarese, Marco, Rizzello, Salvatore. (2004) The Intermingling Between Cognitive 
Economics and Experimental Economics: a Few Remarks on History, Methodology and 
Applications. . Dipartimento di Economia “S. Cognetti de Martiis, Centro di Studi sulla 
Storia e i Metodi dell’Economia Politica  "Claudio Napoleoni"  (CESMEP)Working 
paper No. 06. 
• Novarese, Marco. Is bounded rationality a capacity, enabling learning? EERI Research 
Paper Series No 12/2009 
• Oeﬀner, Marc:(2008) Agent based Keynesian Macroeconomics-An evolutionary model 
embedded in an agent-based computer simulation. Inaugural Dissertation. 
• Rizzello, Salvatore, Egidi, Massimo. (2003). Cognitive Economics: Foundations and 
Historical Evolution. Dipartimento di Economia “S. Cognetti de Martiis, Centro di 
Studi sulla Storia e i Metodi dell’Economia Politica  "Claudio Napoleoni"  (CESMEP) 
Working paper No. 04. 
• Rizzello, Salvatore. (2003). Towards a cognitive evolutionary economics. Dipartimento 
di Economia “S. Cognetti de Martiis, Centro di Studi sulla Storia e i Metodi 
dell’Economia Politica  "Claudio Napoleoni"  (CESMEP) Working paper No. 03. 
• Rizzello, Salvatore. 2004.  Knowledge as Path-dependence Process, Journal of 
Bioeconomics, 6, 255 – 274. 
[42] 
 
• Roget, P.M. (1834)-“Animal and vegetable psychology considered with refernce to 
natural theology,” 2 vols., Pickering, London. 
• Simon A. Herbert. (1978). Rational decision-making in business organizations. Nobel 
Memorial Lecture, 8 December, 1978. Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania, USA. 
• Simon A. Herbert; (2000), Bounded Rationality in Social Science: Today and 
Tomorrow,  Mind & Society, Vol 1, n. 1, 25-40 
• Simon, A. Herbert (1976). “From Substantive to Procedural Rationality”, in: S. Latsis 
(ed.) Method and Appraisal in Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
pp.129-148. 
• Simon, A. Herbert. (1999). The many shapes of knowledge. Revue d'économie 
industrielle. Vol. 88. 2e trimestre 1999. pp. 23-39. 
• Stevens, B., Porta S., Haak, L.L., Gallo V., Fields, R.D. 2002. Adenosine: A neuron-glial 
transmitter promoting myelination in the CNS in response to action potential. Neuron, 
Vol. 36, No.5, 855-868. 
• Sul Jai-Yoon, Orosz George, Givens S. Richard, Haydon G. Philip. 2004. Astrocyte 
connectivity in the hippocampus. Neuron Glia Biology, Vol.1, 3-11. 
• Thorndike, Edward Lee (1911), Animal Intelligence: Experimental Studies, New York, 
Macmillan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[43] 
 
                                                Appendix 
 
 
The Reward Functions: 
1. 0 →1 →7 →9 →11 →14  
2. 0 →6→8 →13 →12 →10 →14 
3. 0 →4 →5 →14  
4. 0 →1 →4 →5 →14  
5. 0 →6 →4 →5 →14  
6. 0 →6 →8 →2 →3 →12 →10 →14 
7. 0 →6 →8 →2 →5 →14  
8. 0 →6 →8 →13 →3 →14  
9. 0 →6 →4 →7 →9 →11 →14 
10. 0 →4 →7 →9 →11 →14  
11. 0 →6 →8 →2 →3 →14  
12. 0 →1 →4 →7 →9 →11 →14 
13. 0 →6 →8 →13 →3 →12 →10 →14   
14. 0 →4 →2 →3 →14   
15. 0 →4 →2 →5 →14   
16. 0 →4 →2 →3 →12 →10 →14   
17. 0 →1 →4 →2 →5 →14   
18. 0 →1 →4 →2 →3 →14 
19. 0 →1 →4 →2 →3 →12 →10 →14 
20. 0 →6 →4 →2 →5 →14 
21. 0 →6 →4 →2 →3 →14 
22. 0 →6 →4 →2 →3 →12 →10 →14 
 
 
                    Table1. The Value Function Table of Policy Actions 
 
                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Path trajectory of decisions and reward function based on policies: 
1. 0 →1 →7 →9 →11 →14=1+3+1+5+1=11 
2. 0 →6→8 →13 →12 →10 →14=1+1+12-100+40+10=-36(b1) 
3. 0 →4 →5 →14=5+2+8=15  
4. 0 →1 →4 →5 →14 =1-5+2+8=6(c) 
5. 0 →6 →4 →5 →14=1+6+2+8=17  
6. 0 →6 →8 →2 →3 →12 →10 →14=1+1+6+15+2+40+10=75(d1) 
7. 0 →6 →8 →2 →5 →14=1+1+6-20+8=-4 (d2) 
8. 0 →6 →8 →13 →3 →14=1+1+12+1-10=5(b2) 
9. 0 →6 →4 →7 →9 →11 →14=1+6+100+1+5+1=114 
10. 0 →4 →7 →9 →11 →14=5+100+1+5+1=112 
11. 0 →6 →8 →2 →3 →14=1+1+6+15-10=13(d3)  
12. 0 →1 →4 →7 →9 →11 →14=1-5+100+1+5+1=103(c1) 
13. 0 →6 →8 →13 →3 →12 →10 →14=1+1+12+1+2+40+10=67(b3) 
14. 0 →4 →2 →3 →14=5+2+15-10= 12(a1)  
15. 0 →4 →2 →5 →14=5+2-20+8=-5   
16. 0 →4 →2 →3 →12 →10 →14= 5+2+15+2+40+10=74(a2) 
17. 0 →1 →4 →2 →5 →14=1-5+2-20+8=-12(e1)   
18. 0 →1 →4 →2 →3 →14=1-5+2+15-10=3(e2)   
19. 0 →1 →4 →2 →3 →12 →10 →14=1-5+2+15+2+40+10=65(e3) 
20. 0 →6 →4 →2 →5 →14=1+6+2-20+8=-3(f1)  
21. 0 →6 →4 →2 →3 →14=1+6+2+15-10=13(f2)  
22. 0 →6 →4 →2 →3 →12 →10 →14=1+6+2+15+2+40+10=76(f3) 
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                      Text Box.1 Overall Efficiency from MDP model 
 
 
 
  
 
 Total Initial Value of the system before the program:                                  85 
 
Total value unlocked or rewards derived by the agents:                             921 
 
Total No. of Policies:                                                                                                22 
 
Mean (avg.) Reward per agent:                                                                          41.86  
 
Efficiency Rate:                                                                                                         49% 
 
Reward gained by following PP’s: (excluding. Top 3)                                   563 
 
Reward Value of Top three Policies:                                                                 35.72 (329) 
 
Reward Value of Top three Policies as a %:                                                      35.72%   
                             
Reward Value gained by top 14 patterns per agent:                                       40.21 
 
Efficiency of patterned policy choices:                                                               61.12%  
 
Mean reward gained by following random policies:                                         6.25 
 
Total rewards gained following non-patterned policies as a percentage:   4.3% 
 
Total Reward Value gained by following PP’s as a %:                                     96.85  
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Textbox 2. Summary Statistics of policy groups and reward value functions 
 
Some useful web-guides related to Reinforcement Learning.: 
1. Reinforcement Learning Repository at http://www-anw.cs.umass.edu/rlr 
2. University of Alberta on the history of Reinforcement learning 
:http://webdocs.cs.ualberta.ca/~sutton/book/ebook/node1.html   
   FIELD         N      MEAN       STD       SEM       MIN       MAX       SUM 
   (Policy Groups) 
     A (a1+a2)                2     43.00     43.84     31.00        12               74        86 
   B (b1+b2+b3)           3     12.00     51.86     29.94       -36               67        36 
   D (d1+d2+d3)           3     28.00     41.58     24.01        -4                75        84 
  E (e1+e2+e3)             3     18.67     40.82     23.57       -12                65        56 
  F (f1+f2+f3)               3     28.67     41.77     24.11        -3                 76        86 
G (g1+g2+g3)             3    109.50      6.36      4.50       103                114       329 
 
